2003年秋天,马斯克站在讲台上,说了一句让全场笑出来的话:在航天工业里发小财的最快办法,是先投一大笔钱进去。
台下哄笑。他站在那儿,穿得像刚下班的工程师,语气平平的,好像这事儿跟他没多大关系。
他讲的这家公司叫 SpaceX,成立才一年多,一枚火箭都没发射过。首飞日期定在「明年三月」,也就是2004年3月。
这场讲座的题目叫「创业领导力」。他讲的内容却是:1995年怎么睡办公室地板、怎么去莫斯科谈一枚翻新的洲际弹道导弹、怎么把一次发射的价格从2500万美元压到600万美元。
十九年后回头看,这场演讲里大部分判断被验证了。也有几处错得很有意思。先说对的。
1995年,风险投资人没听说过互联网
马斯克本来要去斯坦福读能源物理博士。他把入学推迟了「几个季度」,想趁互联网刚起来做点什么。
他跟导师说了这个打算,导师回了一句:「我不觉得你会回来。」那是他们最后一次说话。
1995年的硅谷,情况跟今天完全倒过来。马斯克找了一圈风险投资人,多数人没听说过互联网是什么。这话不是比喻,是字面意思。在沙丘路(Sand Hill Road,硅谷风投一条街)上,他得先花时间跟人解释什么叫上网。
他当时的判断很简单:这是那种很久才出现一次的东西。而且当时想参与进去,几乎只有一条路,自己开公司。能去打工的地方只有网景(Netscape),可能还有一两家别的。
没有钱,这是第二个约束。所以他给自己定了个规矩:得马上做出能赚钱的东西。
他把目光转向媒体行业。逻辑是:报纸杂志要把内容从纸张搬到电子世界,他们手里有钱,而当时互联网上根本没有广告收入。帮他们做这件事,是能收钱的。这就是 Zip2 的起点。
早期客户和投资人名单相当硬:赫斯特集团(Hearst)、骑士里德(Knight Ridder),基本上美国主要印刷出版商都在里面。
起步有多惨?六个人。他自己、一个被他说服从加拿大搬来的弟弟、一个他妈妈的朋友,还有三个在报纸上登招聘广告招来的、按成交额提成的销售。
他当时是负资产,学生贷款压着。租不起公寓,也租不起办公室。算了一下,发现办公室比住的地方便宜,于是就租了办公室,睡在折叠床上,洗澡去 Page Mill 路和 El Camino 路口的 YMCA。他后来说,那是他一辈子身体最好的时候。每天去洗澡、健身,然后接着干活。
办公室楼下有个很小的网络服务商。他们在楼板上钻了个洞,拉了一根 null modem 线下去,一个月网费大概100美元。
这就是1995年的创业公司。烧钱率低到荒谬,收入也很小,但比支出多。所以他去见风投的时候,可以摊开账本说:我们不缺钱。
Zip2 攒到1999年初,康柏(Compaq)出价收购。现金,3亿多美元。马斯克在演讲里专门加了一句评论:这是一种我强烈推荐的货币。
那个只花了一天的小功能
卖掉 Zip2 之后他没休假。立刻开始想下一个机会在哪儿。
他注意到金融服务行业几乎没什么创新。他的推理路径值得抄下来:钱是低带宽的。转账不需要修电网、不需要铺光纤,本质上就是数据库里改一个数字。而且纸币只占全部货币的一小部分。这种东西天生适合搬到互联网上。
所以他们先做了一件很难的事:把一个人所有的金融需求整合到一个网站。银行、券商、保险,都在一页上。
这件事基本做成了。然后他们顺手做了一个小功能,花了一天。
这个小功能是:用电子邮件地址转账。你输入对方的邮箱,或者任何唯一标识符,就能把钱、股票、基金份额转过去。如果对方没注册,系统会自动给他发封信:嘿,要不要开个户?
演示的时候,戏剧性的一幕反复上演。马斯克先展示那套复杂系统:你看,你的银行对账单、基金、保险都在一页上,多方便。观众反应平平。然后他说,顺便我们还做了个功能,输入邮箱就能转账。全场:哇。
他讲到这里,全场笑了。他说,行吧,那我们就聚焦在这个上面。
这就是 PayPal 的雏形。公司当时叫 x.com。
另一边有家叫 Confinity 的公司,起点完全不同。他们做 PalmPilot 上的加密,演示应用是两台掌上电脑通过红外口「beam」代币支付。他们做了个网站叫 PayPal,用来清算这些 beam 出去的账。
然后他们发现,网站那部分比掌上电脑加密有意思多了。于是整个公司往那个方向转。
2000年初,x.com 收购了 Confinity。大约一年后,公司改名叫 PayPal。
两年,一百万用户,没有销售副总裁
这一节马斯克讲得最起劲。
PayPal 是病毒式营销的教科书。他的定义很朴素:一个客户会主动帮你拉来下一个客户,而你什么都不用做。寄钱给朋友,等于把这个朋友拉进了网络。客户越多,增长越快。
他说,就像培养皿里的细菌,那条 S 曲线就是这么长出来的。
数字是:上线一年后开始起量,到第二年底,100万用户。没有销售团队。没有销售副总裁。没有市场副总裁。广告费零。
2002年2月,PayPal 上市。他开玩笑说,大概是那年上半年唯一一家上市的互联网公司。过程不算顺利,正赶上安然事件和一堆公司丑闻,SEC 让他们改招股书的次数,他估计创了纪录。
然后2002年六七月份,eBay 找上门,15亿美元收购。他补了个细节:那时候 eBay 的股价大概55美元,还没拆股。按今天的口径算,差不多30亿美元。
然后他去研究火箭为什么这么贵
这里有个时间上的巧合,马斯克自己也提到了。
2002年上半年,PayPal 忙着上市和被收购的时候,他在业余时间做另一件事:研究航天。
他的问题很直接:1960年代,我们从一个人都送不上天,做到把人送上月球,所有技术从零开始。然后1970、1980、1990年代,整个行业基本是横着走的。到2003年,美国连把人送进近地轨道都做不到。
这事跟其他所有技术领域都对不上。他举了个例子:1970年代初你能买到的电脑,能塞满这间屋子,算力还不如你现在的手机。几乎所有技术都在进步。为什么航天没有?
他一开始以为这是钱的问题,而钱可以通过唤起公众支持来解决。所以他想到一个办法:私人出资做一次去火星的机器人任务。项目叫「火星绿洲」(Mars Oasis)。
方案是:一个小型机器人着陆器,带种子和脱水营养凝胶。着陆后凝胶水化,植物在火星的重力和辐射环境下生长。这同时也是一个在火星表面维持生命支持系统的实验。
为什么这件事能打动公众?他说,公众对「第一次」和「最」有反应。这会是生命走得最远的一次,也是火星上的第一批生命。
预算:1500万到2000万美元。大概是 NASA 一个低成本任务的十分之一。
然后是运载火箭的问题。美国最便宜的火箭是波音的德尔塔II(Delta II),一次5000万美元。对他们想做的事来说,太贵了。
所以他去了三趟莫斯科,想买一枚俄罗斯的运载火箭。他在演讲里加了一句:去莫斯科谈一枚翻新的洲际弹道导弹,在「有意思的经历」这个谱系上,排得相当靠外。
交易实际上谈成了。但附加的麻烦太多,他不愿意承担那个风险。
第三趟回来之后,他问了自己一个问题:为什么俄罗斯人能造出便宜的运载火箭?我们不开俄罗斯车,不坐俄罗斯飞机,家里也没有俄罗斯厨电。原话是:我上一次买不是伏特加的东西是什么时候?
他的结论是:美国是个很有竞争力的地方,我们应该能造出成本可控的运载火箭。
于是他组了一个可行性研究,找来过去三十年参与过所有主要运载火箭研制的工程师,在2002年初的几个周六反复迭代。研究的对象不只是发射成本,还有发射可靠性。
研究结果出来的时间,正好赶上 PayPal 卖给 eBay。交易一完成,他搬去了洛杉矶。他解释说,洛杉矶其实是全世界航天工业最集中的地方,也是南加州最大的产业,比娱乐业大得多。他在帕洛阿尔托住了九年。
火箭的2%定律
有人问,为什么送东西上太空这么贵。
马斯克的回答是:先告诉你火箭难在哪儿。
入轨所需的能量和速度太大,跟汽车甚至飞机比,你几乎没有余量。一枚运载火箭的起飞质量里,通常只有2%能进轨道。猎鹰(Falcon)也是这样。
换句话说:只要有2%的偏差,就一颗卫星都送不上去。火箭会掉进太平洋某处。
这意味着所有计算都必须对。算错一个数,就炸。
而保证所有答案都对、再复核一遍、在地面上把所有能测的都测完,这件事本身极其昂贵。这就是火箭贵的很大一部分原因。
第二个原因是发射频率太低。如果一年有几千次发射,价格会低很多。但这是鸡生蛋:得先便宜,才可能有几千次发射。
他的判断是:火箭本来应该比现在便宜得多。现在的运作方式效率太低了。
猎鹰的售价会是每次600万美元。最近的竞争对手是轨道科学公司(Orbital Sciences)的飞马座(Pegasus),每次2500万美元,能力还不如猎鹰。
航天飞机到底哪里不对
这一段他讲得非常具体,几乎是工程清单。
当时美国三架航天飞机全部停飞。首飞可能还要等一年,如果顺利的话。
他列了航天飞机的问题:
- 乘员舱是侧挂的。一旦爆炸,基本是瞬间死亡。
- 固体助推器一旦点火就关不掉。
- 把燃料和氧化剂预混合,这件事本身就危险。
- 有机翼和控制面。再入时必须保持精确的攻角,哪怕一瞬间的偏差都可能让整架飞行器解体。
- 没有逃逸系统。出事就是出事。
成本:航天飞机项目把所有部分加起来,一年40亿美元。除以每年的飞行次数,就是单次成本。如果一年飞四次(已经很久没飞到了),单次就是10亿美元。
近期计划是继续建空间站,所以航天飞机还得飞,但大概只会飞最低限度的次数。
长期计划叫「轨道太空飞机」(Orbital Space Plane)。他专门吐槽了这个名字:说「飞机」得加引号,因为其中一个方案是胶囊式的,也许该叫「轨道太空东西」。
好处是会有逃逸系统,出事能中止。坏处是仍然很贵。单次飞行估计3亿到4亿美元。其中2亿美元单独付给波音的德尔塔IV重型火箭,一次性助推器。
整个研制费用150亿美元,预计九到十年完成。他补了一句:历史上这类项目很少不超支、不延期。所以按先例看,150亿美元和2012年的时间表,大概率守不住。
俄罗斯、中国,还有几个玩火箭的硅谷人
俄罗斯:联盟号(Soyuz)是美国进入空间站的唯一通道。便宜得多,也安全得多。记录很好。乘员舱在顶部,有逃逸系统,没有机翼和控制面。整体是个不错的系统。单次大约6000万美元,比航天飞机便宜一个数量级。
制约他们的是经济。一个比利时体量的经济体,很难支撑雄心勃勃的航天计划。
中国:他讲话那个月,中国预计要送第一个人上太空。这会让他们成为第三个把人送入轨道的国家。他说,如果说有什么能刺激载人航天,很可能是中国在太空上的雄心,以及美国「至少不想落后于中国」的那种感觉。
中国的目标不止近地轨道。空间站、火星基地、最终送人上火星。
但真正可能超过这一切的,是美国这边的商业航天。
他打了个比方:DARPA 出钱推动了互联网早期的研发,承担了大量基础成本。NASA 可能在做同样的事,先花钱把一些基础技术做出来。一旦商业部门进来,就能看到互联网那种加速。
他点了四个人。
伯特·鲁坦(Burt Rutan),Scaled Composites。世界顶级的飞机设计师之一。做亚轨道飞行器,在莫哈韦试飞。X 奖级别。母舰叫白骑士(White Knight),挂在肚子下面的是太空船一号(Spaceship One)。据说是保罗·艾伦(Paul Allen)出的钱。马斯克说,这说明有相当多的资本正在进入这个领域。
他对这个方案的唯一保留是:架构不太容易放大到入轨。做亚轨道很好,做轨道飞行器得改架构。
约翰·卡马克(John Carmack),写《雷神之锤》和《毁灭战士》的那位。马斯克说,他大概是世界上最好的软件工程师之一,是他认识的最好的工程师之一。做垂直起降飞行器。没有航天背景,基本靠自己加三个朋友。马斯克认为他们能做出能用的东西。但要入轨,需要在质量效率和发动机效率上有大幅提升,而且大概率得做成两级。
杰夫·贝索斯(Jeff Bezos)。马斯克说,他听说贝索斯上周来过这里。贝索斯是铁杆航天支持者。他高中毕业典礼上的致辞讲的就是人类必须向其他星球扩张。据马斯克了解,贝索斯打算在未来20年往航天上投10亿美元这个量级。
然后是他自己的 SpaceX。他说,我们花的钱比前面三家都多,有些地方可能多一个数量级,因为做的事难一个数量级。他们在造一枚入轨运载火箭,两级,高效率发动机,高质量效率。
先送卫星,再送人
SpaceX 的商业策略,马斯克讲得很清楚,也很克制。
第一步:小中型卫星入轨。那是一个确定存在的市场,用这个做收入基础。
第二步:载人。这是公司的长期目标,但他认为聪明的顺序是先做货运,也就是卫星发射。
第三步,最终的升级路径:造土星五号(Saturn V)的继任者。超重型运载,可以用来建月球基地或者执行火星任务。他把这个称为「圣杯」级别的目标。
技术参数:主发动机叫梅林(Merlin),海平面推力大约7.5万磅。上面级发动机真空推力大约7500磅。
首次发射:从范登堡空军基地(Vandenberg Air Force Base)的 SpaceX 发射场,大约2004年3月。载荷是一颗海军卫星,可能是通信卫星。
他专门强调:通常运载火箭公司第一次发射找不到付费客户,他们找到了。
还有一句:猎鹰的研制速度是史上最快的运载火箭研制,包括战时。
这句话后来成了他被反复引用的素材。猎鹰1号首飞是2006年3月,失败了。第二次失败,第三次失败。第四次成功是2008年9月,那时候公司快破产了。他当时说「明年三月」,实际差了两年半。
这是这场演讲里最值得记的一处。
600万对2500万,钱从哪儿省出来的
有人问,猎鹰跟中国、俄罗斯、航天飞机比怎么样。
他先纠正:猎鹰是轻型运载,航天飞机是重型,不是同一个量级。正确的比较对象是飞马座,600万对2500万。
省钱的来源,他强调没有银弹。是几百个小改进的总和。推进系统、结构、航电、发射操作,每一个环节都动过,再加上一个非常精简的组织。
他举了几个例子。
第一,30人公司的管理开销,本身就比洛克希德(Lockheed)或波音低一个数量级。就算其他什么都不变,光这一项就便宜很多。
第二,每一个决定都优先考虑简单。简单的理由是双重的:既提高可靠性,又降低成本。零件少,会坏的零件就少,要买的零件也少。
第三,结构上有个他觉得挺重要的创新:半压力稳定硬壳式结构,蒙皮厚度可变,共底。他说得画个图才能讲清楚。净效果是便宜、质量效率高、容易测试、可靠。
第四,航电。他们在火箭内部用以太网通信。这在别的行业不算什么,在运载火箭里算创新。其他所有运载火箭都用串行电缆,从头贯到尾,铜线捆起来有胳膊那么粗,重、贵、还容易出问题。
30个人造火箭
SpaceX 当时大约30人。
内部做:设计、分析、硬件集成、测试、发射操作。
外包:焊接主结构、重型机加工这些重人力的活。他说,如果全都自己做,公司会大很多。
有人问律师是哪家的。他回答:我们没有律师。
监管相关的事务非常技术性,更像是在 FAA 给飞机做适航认证,只不过他们是在给火箭做认证。他说,倒是希望能把这些活外包给律师,但律师大概也不知道该怎么办。
有人问政府管制。他说,有些限制很烦。比如只能雇有绿卡或美国公民,不能雇没有永久居留权的人。基本上,政府不能把你关进监狱,就不会让你碰火箭相关的东西。
跟任何外国公民谈话,都需要国务院的技术转移协议之类的东西。
他们的第二次发射是一个非美国政府客户。为了能开始合同谈判,光拿国务院的批准就花了六个月。
最好的想法胜出,哪怕它不是我的
有人问他,Zip2 和 PayPal 有什么共同点。
他的回答分几层。
第一层:核心都是软件。Zip2 服务媒体,PayPal 服务金融,但技术心脏都是软件和互联网。
第二层:都在帕洛阿尔托,他自己住的地方。
第三层:建公司的方式类似。一小群非常有才华的人,保持小规模。PayPal 巅峰时期大概30个工程师,支撑的系统他说比美联储的清算系统还复杂。他补了一句:我挺确定是这样的,因为美联储的清算系统很烂。全场笑。
第四层,也是最具体的:经典硅谷创业公司的样子。扁平结构。每个人的工位差不多大。任何人都能跟任何人说话。哲学是「最好的想法胜出」,不是「提出想法的人赢,因为他是谁」。
他加了一句自嘲:虽然有时候我也觉得应该按后一种来。
第五层:所有人都是股权持有者。
第六层,关于决策速度:如果有两条路,看不出哪条明显更好,他们不会花大量时间去论证哪条好一点点,而是直接选一条干。有时候会选错,会走次优路径,但选一条路去干,通常比在选项上无限犹豫要好。
第七层,关于知识产权:他们不太在意 IP 文件和法律文书。非常专注于把产品做到最好。Zip2 和 PayPal 都是产品导向的公司。对「怎么做出最好的客户体验」这件事极度执迷。这比养一个庞大的销售团队、想营销花招、搞十二步流程,有效得多。
病毒式营销的本质
有人提到 Friendster。马斯克说他对这家公司不太熟。但他给了病毒式营销的定义:
本质是,你有没有一个东西,能让一个客户在你不做任何事的情况下,把另一个客户卖进来。
例子:Hotmail、PayPal、eBay,Friendster 可能也算。
这种场景下,产品的重要性被放大到极致。因为你要把东西推荐给别人,你得真的喜欢那个产品体验。否则你不会推荐,你不想坑朋友。
别把该并行的事排成队
这一节讲 PayPal 的后台建设,是整场演讲里最实用的部分之一。
PayPal 需要对接一堆后台关系,接到各种异构数据源上。要接信用卡系统处理信用卡。要接美联储系统做电子资金转账。要接各种欺诈数据库跑欺诈检查。要对接的东西很多,花了不少时间。
但这些事情最后基本同时落地。软件开发到能对公众开放,跟对外部供应商的谈判完成,时间上大致吻合。整个过程大约一年。
他的原则是:尽量不要把有依赖关系的事情串行化。能并行的都并行。
理由是:很多事情有孕育期。孕育期很难加速。所以如果能让所有事情在并行中各自孕育,时间线能大幅压缩。
他的观察是:人们倾向于把事情串行化得太多了。
专利在防守时有用,进攻时很难
他们给 PayPal 系统申请了几项专利。他说,没有一项真正起过作用。
他的看法:专利主要用于防守,不太适合进攻。真正去起诉一项专利非常困难。
在某些行业,比如制药,专利极其重要。软件不同,尤其是生命周期很短的时候。等你拿到专利,事情已经做完了,谁在乎。
快循环的行业里,专利的相关性低得多。
太空采矿和太空太阳能,经济上算不过来
有人问太空里有什么大机会。
他先泼冷水:有两件事他觉得挺扯的。一个是太空采矿,一个是太空太阳能发电。
理由很直接:算一下把光子从太空传回地球、或者把原材料运回地球的成本,经济账算不平。差得不是一点,大概差三个数量级。
他认为真正大的机会是:在月球或火星上建基地,尤其是建一个能自我维持的基地,一个能自我维持的文明。那是万亿美元级别的机会。因为这意味着星际贸易真正开始运转。
但不会是太空太阳能,也不会是太空采矿。
在硅谷,你活在自由意志主义的天堂
有人问进入航天业的门槛。
他说,监管结构非常复杂。一枚入轨运载火箭跟洲际弹道导弹没有本质区别,所以监管很多。他认为这些监管大概应该有,毕竟你不想发射点什么结果砸到洛杉矶。
监管和环保审批都比预想的难得多。
然后他说了整场演讲里最锋利的一段:
在硅谷,你活在自由意志主义的天堂。几乎没有什么监管。让人沮丧的是,监管往往是不理性的,讲不通。但执行监管的人只是在执行一套规则,不管这些规则是否讲得通。你可以试着说服他们规则讲不通,他们不会听。(马斯克)
所以,监管大概是最烦人的东西。
不过总体上他很满意。开发过程很顺利,他没什么可抱怨的。
为什么卖掉 PayPal
有人问,为什么卖了。
他说,他们收到过好几家的报价。越接近 IPO,报价越多。但他们一直觉得那些报价低估了公司。后来上市了,公开市场给出了估值。
他认为公开市场的一个好处是:公司有一个客观价值。私营公司很难说清楚自己值多少。你得想各种指标,市盈率、收入倍数、可比公司,全是可争论的。上市之后,市场说你值多少,你就值多少。
eBay 在 IPO 之前给过几个报价,明显低于上市后的估值。上市把这个分歧解决了,然后他们卖了。
在 eBay 自己的地盘上打败 eBay
有人追问收购之后的竞争。
他说,eBay 一开始做的是 Billpoint,还有 eBay Payments。PayPal 跟 eBay 自己的支付系统打了一场很长时间的硬仗。
他的形容是:有时候感觉像是在亚洲打一场地面战争。
还有一句:他们定规则,你要在他们的操作系统上打败微软。非常难。为了在 eBay 自己的系统上赢,他们投入了大量精力。
公司的一个长期风险是:eBay 哪天赢了。消除这个风险的一个办法,就是卖给 eBay。
给想创业的人
有人问,成功的创业者有什么共同特质。
他说,成功的创业者什么样都有。他不确定有某一种特定的东西。
对他来说,几件事很重要。
第一,对产品质量有一种执念。他原话是:在这个语境下,强迫症是好事。
第二,真的喜欢你做的事。因为即使你是最顶尖的,失败的概率也一直在。所以你得真的喜欢。如果不喜欢,人生太短。而且,如果你喜欢,你不工作的时候也会想它,你的脑子会被它吸引过去。如果不喜欢,你就是做不成。
第三,关于商学院。他说,商科教育教你很多术语,让你接触到一些概念,否则你得靠经验去学。他认为你可以在学校里学,也可以在学校外学。学校理论上应该加速这个过程,很多时候确实如此。但有的成功创业者高中都没毕业,也有的有博士学位。重要的原则是:致力于学会你需要会的东西,不管是在学校里还是靠经验。
有人问他,会不会建议别人现在去创业做航天。
他说不会。他说 SpaceX 是「高级创业」。
然后他讲了那句全场笑的话:在航天业发小财的最快办法,是先投一大笔钱进去。
他说,航天对第一次创业的人太难了。你最好从资本需求低的事情开始,航天是资本密集型的。
这句话放在2003年,是一个还没发射过火箭的人说的。两年多以后,猎鹰1号第一次发射,失败。又失败了两次。第四次成功是2008年9月,那时候公司差一点破产。
但这场演讲里那些判断,关于成本、关于垂直整合、关于简化、关于并行,后来基本都成了商业航天的常识。
值得留意的是他在2003年就已经说清楚的一件事:航天的瓶颈从来不是物理,是成本结构和运作方式。这个判断,二十年后的星舰还在验证。
- 把单位成本拆到零件级。SpaceX 的600万不是靠一个大创新,是靠几百个小决定。你做硬件、做供应链、做任何有实体成本的生意,先别找银弹,先把每一个环节的浪费找出来。
- 决策别拖过一天。两条路看不出明显高下的时候,选一条干。犹豫的成本比走错路的成本高,因为犹豫不产生任何信息。
- 有孕育期的事情全部并行启动。供应商谈判、资质审批、软件开发,别排成队。这些事加速不了,只能同时开始。
- 产品本身就是营销。问自己一个问题:你会主动把这个东西推荐给朋友吗?不会的话,别人也不会。销售团队补不上这个缺口。
- 小团队省的不只是钱,是决策速度。30个工程师可以支撑一个比美联储清算系统更复杂的系统。人多了,沟通成本涨得比产出快。
- 监管是成本项,不是障碍。把它算进时间表。指望说服执行规则的人放弃规则,是浪费自己的时间。
- 进高资本行业之前,先问自己喜不喜欢。不工作的时候你还会想它吗?如果不会,这个行业太难了,熬不过去。
0:00I'll try to make this as interesting as possible. If you like space, you'll like this talk. So, my background in brief, I'll I'll talk a little bit about Zip2 and and PayPal and then mostly about space and what we're doing in space. so I originally came out California to do energy physics at Stanford, actually. and ended up putting this is in '95 and ended up putting that on hold to start Zip2.
0:28and Zip2 I'll I'll tell you a little bit about the thought process of exactly what happened there. Welcome [music] to Zoom Dows.
0:45in '95, that it wasn't at all clear that the internet was going to be a big commercial thing. In fact, most of the venture capitalists that I talked to hadn't even heard of the internet, which sounds bizarre. and on Sand Hill Road, so but but I wanted to do something in in the area. I thought it would be a pretty huge thing. And I thought it was one of those things that only came came along once in in a very long while. So, I I got a deferment
1:12at Stanford and and thought I'd give it a couple quarters. and if it didn't work out, which I thought it probably wouldn't, then I'd come back at the school. And actually when I talked to my professor and I told him this, he said, "Well, I don't think you'll be coming back." And that was the last conversation I had with him. So.
1:31but there weren't a lot of ways to get The only way to get involved in the internet in '95 that I could think of was to start a company cuz there weren't a lot of companies to go and work for, apart from Netscape maybe one or two others. So, and then I didn't have any money, so I thought, "Well, we've got to make something that's going to return that's going to return money very very quickly." So, we we thought, "Well, the the the media industry would need help in converting its content from from a print media to electronic." And they clearly had money.
2:01So, if we could find a way to help them move their media to the internet, that would be an obvious way of of generating revenue. And there was no advertising revenue on the internet at the time. So, and that that was really the the basis of of Zip2. And we ended up building quite a bit of software for for the media industry, primarily the print media industry. so, we had as investors and customers Hearst Corporation, Knight Ridder, mo- most of the the major US print publishers.
2:29we built that up and then we had the opportunity to sell to Compaq in in early '99 and basically took that offer. It was for a little over $300 million in cash. And that's that's a currency I highly recommend. So, so we had that and and but but I wanted to do something something more after Zip2. So,
2:55post the sale, in fact, immediately post sale, I didn't really take any time off. I just try to think of where where the where the opportunities in this in early '99, where the opportunities remained in the internet. And it seemed to me that there hadn't been a lot of innovation in the financial services sector.
3:11So, and and when you think about it, money is is low bandwidth. You don't need some sort of big infrastructure improvement to to do to do things with it. It's really just an entry in the database. The the paper form of money is is really only a small percentage of all the money that that's out there. So, it should lend itself to innovation on the internet. and so we we thought of a couple of different things we could do.
3:32One One of the things was to combine all of somebody's financial services needs into one website. So, you could have banking, brokerage, insurance, and all sorts of things in one place. and and that was actually quite a difficult problem to solve. but we we we we we solved most of the issues associated with that. And then we had a little feature which took us about a day.
3:53that was the ability to email money from one customer to another. So, you could type in an email address or actually any unique identifier and transfer funds or conceivably stocks or mutual funds or whatever from from one account holder to another. And if you try to transfer money to somebody who didn't have an account in the system, it would then forward an email to them saying, "Hey, why don't you sign up and open an account?" So, and whenever we demonstrate these two sets of features, we'd say, "Well, this this is a feature that took us a lot of effort to do and look how you can see your bank statement and your your mutual funds and and insurance and all that.
4:29It's all on one page and look how convenient that is." And people go, "Oh, oh, oh." And then we'd say, "And by the way, we have this feature where you can enter somebody's email address and transfer those funds." And they go, "Wow." so so we we [laughter]
4:41We're like, "Okay." so we focused the the company's business on on email payments. and and in the early going, the company was called x.com and then there was a there was another company called Confinity, which had actually also started out from a from a different area. they started out with the PalmPilot cryptography.
4:59And they had as a demo application the ability to beam token payments from one PalmPilot to another via the infrared port. and then they had a a website, which is called PayPal, where you'd reconcile the beamed payments. and and what they found was that the the website portion was actually more interesting to people than the than PalmPilot cryptography was. So, they they started leaning their business in that direction.
5:22and then in basically early 2000, x.com acquired Confinity and then about a year later, we we ended up changing the company's name to PayPal. And that's that's kind of how the the approximate evolution of of the company. and but PayPal is really a case of of of where, the the whole viral marketing, it's really a a perfect case example of of viral marketing like Hotmail was, where one one one customer would essentially act as a salesperson for you for all the for for bringing in other customers. So, they would send money to a friend and essentially recruit that friend into the network. And so you had this exponential growth. The more customers
6:08you had, the faster it grew. so you That's it was like bacteria in a petri dish. You know, it just goes like it does this S curve. and in fact I I ran PayPal for about the first 2 years of its existence. And we launched after year one, and by the end of year two we had a million customers.
6:28So it gives you an exact you know, it gives you a sense for how fast things things grow in that scenario. We And we didn't have a sales force. We didn't we actually didn't have a VP of sales. We didn't have a VP of marketing. and we didn't spend any money on advertising. In about February of last year, for those some some of you are probably following it, in February of last year PayPal went public. and we were I think we were the only internet company to go public in first part of last year. It went off reasonably well.
6:59although I think we had more SEC rewrites than than any company I can imagine. Like we set a record in SEC rewrites. This was right around the Enron time and when there was all sorts of corporate scandals, so they put us through the wringer. and then shortly thereafter, in about June-July, we struck a deal with eBay to sell the company to to eBay.
7:22and over for about 1 and 1/2 billion dollars. but that was when eBay's stock price was about $55 [snorts] and they hadn't split. so I guess in today's dollars we'd be about 3 billion dollars. so it worked out pretty well. It It happened coincidentally that in in the first part of last year, I've been doing just some background research on on space. And let me talk a bit about that.
7:51So essentially I I was trying to figure out why we had not made more progress since since Apollo. in in 19 In the '60s, we went from basically nothing, not being able to put anyone into space, to putting people on the moon. And developing all the technology from scratch to to do that. And yet in the '70s and '80s and the '90s, we we've kind of gone sideways. And and we're currently in a situation where we can't even put a person into into lower orbit.
8:19And that that doesn't really gel with all of the other technology sectors out there. the computer that you could have bought in the early '70s, you know, would have filled this room and had less computing power than your cell phone. and so just about every sector of technology has improved. Why has this not improved?
8:36so I started looking into that. Initially, I thought, well, perhaps it's a question of funding, and that funding can be garnered by by really marshaling public support. so I thought, well, one way to to to get the public excited about space would be to do maybe a privately funded robotic space mission to Mars.
8:55and so we figured out a mission that would cost about 15 to 20 million dollars, which isn't a lot of money, but it's about a a tenth of what a low-cost NASA mission would be. And and the idea was was called Mars Oasis, where we'd put a small robotic lander on the surface of Mars with seeds and dehydrated nutrient gel that would hydrate upon landing, and you'd have plants growing in a Martian radiation gravity conditions. And you'd also be maintaining essentially life support system on the surface of Mars.
9:24And this would be interesting to the public because they tend to respond to precedents and superlatives. and this would be the furthest that life's ever traveled and the first life on Mars, so pretty significant. And then when I started looking at at launch vehicles, the lowest cost vehicle in the US is Boeing's Delta II, which costs about 50 million dollars.
9:42And and that's a bit that's a bit steep for what we were trying to do. so I made three visits to to Moscow, to Russia, to look at at buying a a Russian launch. and it's it's actually pretty interesting going to to Moscow to negotiate for a refurbished ICBM. if, you know, on the range of interesting experiences, pretty pretty far out there.
10:10but but we actually did get to to a deal, but there were so many complications associated with the deal that that I it didn't I wasn't comfortable with the risk associated with it. so, when I got back from the third trip, I thought, "Well, you know, why is it the Russians can build these low-cost launch vehicles?" Because it's not like we we drive Russian cars, fly Russian planes, or have Russian kitchen appliances. And you know, when's the last time I bought something Russian that wasn't vodka? So, I I think the US is a pretty competitive place, and and we should be able to to build a a cost-efficient launch vehicle.
10:46So, I I I put together a feasibility study, which consisted of of engineers that have been involved with all the major launch vehicle developments over the last three decades. And we iterated over a number of Saturdays in the beginning of last year to figure out, well, what would be what would be the smartest way to approach this problem of not just launch cost, but also launch reliability.
11:04And and we came up with a default design. And and that actually sort of fortunate timing, that feasibility study finished up right around the time that we agreed to sell PayPal to eBay. So, coincident with that sale, I moved down to to LA, where there's actually the biggest concentration of aerospace industry in the world.
11:24It's actually the biggest industry in in Southern California, much bigger than entertainment or anything else. I I was living in in Palo Alto for about 9 years before that. Anyway, so just to talk a little broadly about space and where things are today. obviously, US government manned exploration is not in a great place. we've got the the three remaining shuttles are grounded. It looks like first flight might only be a year from now, if that. and and we've got a vehicle that is incredibly expensive and and and really quite dangerous.
11:58it's you know, for reasons mentioned there, it's got a side mount to crew compartment. So, if there's an an explosion, it's basically instant death. the you've got solid rocket boosters, which once you ignite them, you can't turn them off. And there's something fundamentally dangerous about premixing your fuel and oxidizer, I think.
12:15and then it's you've got wing wings and control surfaces. When you cut when you reenter, you've got to maintain a precise angle of attack. even a momentary variance in that can break the whole vehicle apart. So, and then and and then of course it's got no escape system. So, if anything does go wrong, you're toast.
12:30And and then you've got a cost that is is really pretty hard to fathom. The the the shuttle program when you add up all the pieces is about 4 billion a year. And so, you can divide 4 billion by the number of flights and that'll tell you what the cost is. and and if if there's say four flights a year, which they haven't been for a while, then you're talking about a billion dollars a flight.
12:53the plans for the immediate future obviously we've got to continue building the space station. so, we're going to keep flying the shuttle, but but I think it's probably going to be the minimum number of shuttle flights that we need to launch. The the long-term plans I'll build it's called it's called orbital space plane. I say plane in quotes because one of the options is a capsule. so, it should be called you know, maybe orbital space thing.
13:19But but the the basic idea is to have something that's hopefully a little cheaper and a lot safer than the space shuttle. So, in particular, it's going to have an escape system. So, if something does go wrong, you can abort to safety. The the downside is that it's still it's it while it might be a little cheaper, it's still going to be pretty darn expensive. They estimate a cost per flight of orbital space plane at somewhere in the region of 300 to 400 million dollars flight.
13:45and of that that amount 200 just 200 million dollars alone is goes to Boeing for the Delta IV Heavy expendable booster. and and the it's a 15 billion dollar development effort and expected to be completed in 9 or 10 years. Now, typically typically things have have not been under budget and under time.
14:10so, it's unlikely, I think, given historical precedent that that it will stay within $15 billion and the 2012 timeline. and a bit about what's going on on elsewhere in the world. In Russia, the this is really the Soyuz is our only access to space station. it's considerably cheaper, considerably safer. the Soyuz has a very good track record.
14:34it's it it crew is top mounted, it has an escape system, there are no wings or control surfaces to go wrong. overall, it's a it's a pretty good system. and this made it cost about $60 million a flight, which is order of magnitude order of magnitude less than than the space shuttle.
14:50the thing that constrains them, obviously, is the weakness of the Russian economy. It's very hard for them to embark on ambitious programs with an economy the size of Belgium. So, China [clears throat] is is probably the most interesting thing that's that's going on in space. the this month, China is expected to be only the third it's expected to launch their first person into space.
15:11That'll make them only the third country ever to put someone in orbit. and they they they put a lot of of money and effort into this program. If if anything serves as a spur for human space exploration, it is likely to be the China's ambitions in space. and and and hopefully a sense in America that we want to at least keep up with with China.
15:35and they have grand ambitions beyond just low earth orbit. They're planning on setting up a space station, putting a base on Mars, and eventually sending humans to Mars. So, what's happening in in in the US that I think might ultimately surpass all of that stuff is entrepreneurial space activities, where things are led by the spirit of free enterprise. And I I think there's perhaps an analogy here where just as DARPA served as the initial impetus for for the internet and underwrote a lot of the costs of developing the internet in the beginning, one it it it may be the case that NASA has has has essentially done the same thing by spending the
16:16money to develop some of the fundamental technologies in the beginning and then once we can bring to the commercial pre-enterprise sector into it, then we can see the dramatic acceleration that we did that we saw in the internet. So there there are several serious launch vehicle efforts underway.
16:33Talk about each one. There's the Burt Rutan of Scaled Composites. Burt Rutan is is one of the world's foremost aircraft designers and he's developed a suborbital vehicle that they're actually flying out of Mojave. And this is the X-Prize class vehicle. there's John Carmack who wrote Quake and Doom. He's probably one of the best software engineers in the world.
16:52One of the best engineers that I know, period. and he's developing a vertical takeoff and landing vehicle. Jeff Bezos who I understand was here last week is is a huge space advocate. and it's my understanding that he intends to spend something in the order of a billion dollars over the next 20 years on space exploration.
17:12And and then space then my company SpaceX. And I I think within the next several years these entrepreneurial efforts will actually be what what drives space exploration. So a little bit about each one. That's a picture of of the Burt Rutan effort. It's called White Knight is the carrier plane and then Spaceship One is the thing that's held in the belly there.
17:35And this project is supposedly funded by Paul Allen. So there's quite a lot of capital also, I should make that point, quite a lot of capital that's entering this entrepreneurial space sector as well. I the only drawback I think of this architecture is that it's not really scalable for for something that would get to orbit.
17:55This is pretty good for suborbital, but I think the architecture would need to change for an orbital vehicle. And there's John Carmack's effort. he's a little irreverent. This is from his website. His his vehicle is a vertical takeoff and landing vehicle. He's made He's made really incredible progress. Somebody who has no background in aerospace engineering and is also kind of doing it all himself with him and like three buddies.
18:26so, and and I think they will make something that works. Actually, if you check out their website, Armadillo Aerospace, it's pretty interesting stuff. But, in order to get to orbit, this would require a substantial improvement in the mass efficiency and the engine efficiency, and probably be a two-stage vehicle.
18:44Jeff Bezos, who I'm sure almost everyone here is aware he's a pretty huge fan of space. In fact, his high school valedictorian speech was about the necessity of humanity expanding to other planets. so, it's it's pretty important to him, from what I understand. this is our effort.
19:09we're spending quite a bit more than the three prior entities that I mentioned. in some cases, probably an order order of magnitude more, because what we're doing is really an order of magnitude more difficult. We're building an orbital launch vehicle. It's a two-stage, very high efficiency engines, very high mass efficiency launch vehicle.
19:26And it's targeted to the satellite delivery market. So, our approach is really to make this a solid, sound business. And so, I predicated the the strategic plan on a known market, something that I we know for a fact exists, which is the need to put small medium-size satellites into orbit.
19:44And so, that's what we're going after initially. And then, with that as a as kind of a revenue base, we will move into the human transportation market. It's a long-term aim of the company, I definitely human transportation. But, I think this the smart strategy is to first go for cargo delivery, essentially, satellite delivery.
20:03And our eventual upgrade path is to build the successor to Saturn V. Build a super heavy-lift vehicle that could you know, be used for setting up a moon base or doing a Mars mission. That would be the holy grail objective. on the upper right there, you can see test firing of our engine. And on the lower right, you can see the our first stage tank.
20:30this is an engine test of our main engine, which is called Merlin.
20:46And that that generates about roughly 75,000 lb of thrust at sea level. This is our upper stage engine. It's about It's about 7,500 lb of thrust in vacuum. And this is a a accelerated version of our launch sequence. our first launch will be from the SpaceX launch complex at Vandenberg Air Force Base at approximately March of next year, basically early next year.
21:22and we'll be flying a a navy satellite, maybe communication satellite. So, it's it's notable because often launch vehicle companies are not able to get somebody like get a paying customer on their first flight, but we've we've been able to do that. this is also the Falcon development at SpaceX is the fastest launch vehicle development in history, including wartime.
21:53So, that's actually Vandenberg Air Force Base, which is about 2 hours away from Santa Barbara. Common themes between Zip2 and PayPal, well, I guess both of them involved had had software at the as the heart of the technology. even though Zip2 was in was was servicing the media sector, and obviously PayPal was servicing the financial sector, the the the heart of it was really software and and internet-related stuff.
22:23So, certainly that's a a huge commonality. they were both in Palo Alto, where I lived. I think we you know, took a similar approach to building both companies, which was to have a small group of very talented people and and keep it small. You know, I think PayPal had at at its height probably 30 engineers for for a system that's I'd say is more sophisticated than the Federal Reserve clearing clearing system.
22:55I'm pretty sure it is actually cuz the Federal Reserve clearing system sucks. [laughter]
23:02So, what else is there? It It generally You know, I think the way both of two and PayPal operate was was really your It was your canonical Silicon Valley so startup. you know, pretty flat hierarchy. You know, everybody had a roughly similar cube. and Anyone could talk to anyone. We had a philosophy of best idea wins as opposed to you know, the person proposing the idea winning because they are who they are.
23:31Even though there are times when I thought that should have been the way it goes. and Obviously, you know, everyone was was an equity stakeholder. Didn't give us anything. If if if there were two paths that you know, let's say we had to choose to do one thing or the other and the one wasn't obviously better than the other, then rather than spend a lot of time trying to figure out which one was slightly better, we would just pick one and do it.
24:01And sometimes we'd be wrong. And and and we'd pick the sub-optimal path, but often it's better to pick a path and do it than to just vacillate endlessly on on a choice. we we didn't worry too much about intellectual property paperwork, legal stuff. We We really were very focused on building the best product that we possibly could. Both of two and PayPal were very product-focused companies.
24:27you know, that's it's com- incredibly obsessive about how do we build something that is really going to be the, you know, the best possible customer experience. and and that that that was a far more effective selling tool than having a giant sales force or thinking of, you know, marketing gimmicks or, you know, 12-step processes or whatever.
24:50I'm not super familiar with Friendster. certainly I mean the essence of viral marketing is do you have something that one customer is going to where one customer is going to sell another customer without you having to do anything. and there are there are lots of instances of that. Friendster might be one. obviously Hotmail was one.
25:09PayPal was one. eBay was one. and and in a situation like that going back to what I said about product, product matters incredibly because if you're going to recommend something to somebody, you've got to really love the product experience. Otherwise, you're not going to recommend it cuz you don't want to burn your friend.
25:27The hurdles [clears throat] in the space industry entering the space industry Well, you know, it it is a very a complicated regulatory structure. as you might imagine, when somebody tries to build an orbital launch vehicle, which is not really all that distinguishable from an ICBM, there's a lot of regulation. and they probably should be because, you know, you don't want to launch something and end up hitting LA.
25:50or LA. so probably the regulatory stuff was very difficult. the environmental approvals certainly proven very difficult. much more so than we expected. I mean, here in Silicon Valley, you you know, what I came to appreciate is in Silicon Valley, you live in a libertarian paradise.
26:10you know, there's almost no regulation. and what can be very frustrating is that regulation is often irrational. It doesn't make any sense. but you've got somebody there who is simply executing a set of rules, independent of whether those rules make sense. And you can try to convince them that the rules don't make sense and they won't listen to you.
26:27So, probably regulation is the most annoying thing. I would say overall though I'm very pleased because I think we've had a very smooth development process and on the whole I can't complain at all. yeah, why is it so expensive to send something into space? well, let me tell you what makes a rocket hard.
26:49the the energy and the velocity required to get into orbit it is is so substantial that compared to say a car or even a plane the you have almost no margin to play with. Typically a launch vehicle will get about 2% of its lift-off mass to orbit. So, and that's the case for for Falcon. And so, if you can only get 2% of what your rocket weighs to begin with to to orbit, you you can if you're wrong by 2% you're not going to get anything to orbit. [laughter]
27:22You know, come crashing down in the Pacific somewhere. so that means all of your calculations have to be right. If if you miss if you miscalculate something you get an answer wrong, it blows up. and and it's very expensive trying to get all your answers right and then double-checking that they're right and testing them all and doing as much as you can on the ground. I think that's a lot of what makes rockets expensive.
27:44the low launch rate typically is also what makes rockets rockets expensive. If you had, you know, thousands of flights a year then it would be a lot cheaper. Although it's a bit of a chicken and egg because it needs to be cheaper in order to have thousands of flights a year. but at the end of the day when you in the final analysis I would say that rockets really should be a lot cheaper than they are today. And and I think the way that they're both the way that they're operated is just very inefficiently.
28:10and I I I think with with SpaceX and Falcon we're going to we're going to show that that's that's the case. our vehicle will sell for about $6 million a flight. that our nearest competitor is the Pegasus from Orbital Sciences which is about $25 million a flight. And that has less capability than our rocket.
28:29so Falcon will represent a pretty substantial breakthrough the cost aspect of the space.
28:37Can you talk a little bit about the difference in the customer base you have to target with SpaceX versus X prices with like PayPal and how much more challenging that presents?
28:47yeah, the customer base with SpaceX is just it's dramatically different obviously from PayPal. PayPal's a consumer product. whereas SpaceX, we're selling rockets and the number of people who want to buy rockets is quite small. if anyone here has $6 billion and wants to buy a rocket, I don't know if they'd be glad to sell it to them.
29:04but so so it's much more of an individual selling process. it there's a great deal more thought that goes into any purchase of a launch much more so than signing up a PayPal account, which doesn't really cost you much. so yeah, and there's not a lot of viral marketing that's going to happen with the rocket, I suspect.
29:24I'm hoping that, you know, I'm not counting on it. So. I think a successful entrepreneur has probably come in all sizes, shapes, and flavors. I'm not sure there's any one one particular thing. for me, you know, some of the things I've described already, I think are very important. I think really an an obsessive nature with respect to the quality of the product it is very important. yes, so you know, being obsessive-compulsive is is a good thing in this context.
29:58really really liking what you do. What whatever area that you get into given that you know, even if you're if you're the best of the best, there's always a chance of failure. So, I think it's important that you really like whatever you're doing. if if you don't like it, life is too short.
30:13you know, I I'd say if if and and also if you if you like what you're doing, you think about it even when you're not working. I mean you you'll it'll just it it's it's something that your mind is drawn to. and and if you don't like it, you just really can't make it work, I think.
30:31SpaceX is about 30 people. and and what we do internally at SpaceX is we do all of the design, analysis, integration of hardware, testing, and then launch operations. but a lot of the heavy manpower stuff, like welding together our primary structure, the heavy machining and so forth, that we outsource. So, we'd be much larger company if we did all of that internally.
30:55and sorry, you had another part to your question?
30:57Just where are your lawyers from your firm?
30:59Oh, yeah. Actually, we don't have any lawyers. the the the regulatory stuff that we we deal with is very technical. it it's it's really a lot like trying to get an airplane certified with the FAA. we're just getting a rocket certified. so so our documentation is it's very I I wish we could offload it to to some lawyers. They wouldn't know what the heck to do, so.
31:24you know, how did the Wharton degree help? I think it a business degree teaches you a lot of the terminology, introduces you to concepts that you would otherwise You know, this terminology, is somebody going to say that? you know, introduces you to concepts you you would otherwise have to learn empirically. I mean, I think I think you can you can learn whatever you need to do to start a successful business either in school or out of school.
31:48school in you know, in theory should help accelerate that process. and I think it you know, it often times it does. It it's a it can be an efficient learning process, perhaps more efficient than empirically learning lessons. but really I think you I mean, there are examples of of successful entrepreneurs who never graduated high school, and there are those that have PhDs. So, I think the important principle is to be dedicated to learning what you need to know, whether that is in school or empirically. [clears throat]
32:24well, I should point out that Falcon our first vehicle doesn't really have the same capability as as either the Chinese, the Russian, or or the space shuttle vehicles that I mentioned. Falcon would be in in the light class of launch vehicles, whereas the space shuttle would be a heavy class launch vehicle. so it's not it's not quite an apples to apples comparison.
32:43However, it the right comparison would be Falcon compared to the Pegasus from Orbital Sciences. Falcon is $6 million, the Pegasus is $25 million. and the way we we've gotten our prices low, our costs low, is we've really focused on every element of the launch vehicle. There's really no one silver bullet that has has been responsible for a substantial portion of of the cost savings. It's been really hundreds of small innovations and improvements. and so we've done improvements in the propulsion system, the structure, the avionics, and the launch operations, as well as maintained a very low overhead organization. And when you add up all the things we've done in those areas,
33:20that allows us to produce a launch vehicle at $6 million. the as as far as PayPal, there were a lot of back office relationships that we needed to establish and to attach to various heterogeneous data sources. we needed to attach to the credit card system for processing credit cards. We needed to attach to the Federal Reserve system for doing electronic funds transfers.
33:47we needed to attach to various fraud databases to run fraud checks. There there was a lot that we had to we had to interface with. and and that that that took that took a a while. but it all came together, I think, roughly simultaneously. We I mean, developing the software and having it ready for for the general public
34:12reasonably coincided with us being able to conclude those deals and interface with the outside vendors. And all that took about a year. I think one one thing that's important is to try not to serialize dependencies. So if you can put as many elements in parallel as possible, a lot of things have a gestation period.
34:29and there's really nothing you can do to accelerate I mean, there's it's very hard to accelerate that gestation gestation period. so if if you can sort of have all those things gestating in parallel, then then that is one way to substantially accelerate your timeline. I think people tend to serialize things too much.
34:49We we did do a few patents on the PayPal system, although nothing that ever actually mattered. So I I patents are mostly useful in in a defensive situation rather than offensive. It can be very difficult to actually offensive to prosecute a patent. So I I I think I think in certain industries like pharmaceuticals and so forth, patents can be incredibly important.
35:15in software, particularly when you've got a very rapid life cycle where you know you you made you sure you got a patent, but now it's been done it. So who cares? It's less relevant in when you got a rapid life cycle. Well, I I don't You know, I've looked at the various There are a couple things that I think are pretty bogus.
35:35One is space mining, another is the space solar power. I mean, if if you calculate how much it costs to bring either the the photons from space solar power you know, back to earth or or the raw material back to earth, it it economics don't make sense. They they just can't close the economic case. Not not even by It's probably off by three orders of magnitude.
35:57So I think the probably the the biggest thing that could happen is if we if we decide to establish a base on the moon or base on Mars. And particularly if we if we attempt to make it self-sustaining self-sustaining base, self-sustaining civilization on on the moon or Mars, that that is enormous opportunity on probably the trillion dollar level.
36:19cuz then you got basically interplanetary commerce going on. I think that's pretty huge. but but it's it's it's you know, it's not going to be space solar power, it's not going to be space mining, I think. So let's [clears throat] see. the government I mean, you know, who knows? Maybe we're being spied upon. I I don't know. but but certainly we are There are some restrictions which are really annoying such as the fact we're only allowed to employ people who have at least a green card or a citizen of of the US. We're not allowed to employ anyone who is does not have permanent residency in the US.
36:58basically, they can't throw you in jail. They won't they won't let you work work on rocket stuff. and we have if if we talk to any foreign nationals, we we need a a technology transfer agreement or something like that from the State Department. so our second launch is is actually a non-US governmental launch and it's taken us 6 months to get the State Department approval just to engage in a contract discussion with them.
37:24so that that is problematic. we had several offers actually from a number of different entities for for PayPal. and in fact, the closer we got to IPO, the more more offers we got. but we always felt that those undervalued the the company and subsequently, when we went public, I think the public markets kind of indicated the value of the company.
37:50so I think that that's one of the good things about the public markets is that that there are an objective value of companies. When you're a private company, it's very hard to say how much you're worth. because you you have to basically think of some metric, you know, are you going to go for a multiple of future earnings? Are you going to go for some something with revenue? what are your comparables going to be? There are all sorts of questions. It's it's really up for debate what sort of value your company is. When you're public, it's it's you know, it's whatever the market says you're you're worth, that's what you're worth.
38:19so so yeah, so I I think E-eBay made a number of offers prior to going public that were substantially below our the value once we went post public and that kind of cleared up the disagreement and then we we sold them. and what what else it was actually you had a second part to the question.
38:40I just wanted to know if you were just talking about the years after the acquisition or if you had a crash or something in the year after the acquisition.
38:46yeah, eBay had a a a I think it was initially Billpoint and there was eBay payments and and it was really a pretty tough long-running battle of PayPal versus versus eBay's payment system. And it was certainly a very challenging. I mean, I think it was, you know, there were times when it felt like we were trying to win a land war in Asia.
39:07and you know, they kind of set the ground rules or trying to beat Microsoft in their own operating system. It's really really pretty hard. it took a lot of our effort to to actually beat eBay on their own system. and one of the long-term risks, certainly for the company, was that eBay would one day prevail.
39:26and one way to retire that risk, obviously, was to sell to eBay. Writing software during the summer of '95, trying to make useful things happen on the internet. and I wrote something that allowed you get maps and directions on the internet and then something that allowed you to do online manipulation of content, kind of a really advanced blogging system.
39:54and and then we we we started talking to to small newspapers, media companies and so forth and we started getting some interest. I mean, half the time they'd be like, "What's the internet?" even in Silicon Valley. but then occasionally somebody would bite and they would we would get a little bit of money from them.
40:11and then there was basically only about six of us. There were myself, my brother who I convinced to come down from Canada and a friend of my mom's. so and then and then three sales people we hired on contingency by putting an ad in the newspaper. But things were pretty tough in the in the early going.
40:30I didn't have any money. In fact, I had negative money. I had huge student debts. So, well, in fact, I couldn't afford a place to stay and an office. So, I rented an office instead cuz that was I was actually I got a a cheaper office than I could get a get a place to stay and then we I just sort of slept on the futon and showered at the YMCA on Page Mill Road, El Camino.
40:52I was in the best shape I I've ever been, but yeah. Go and shower, work out, and you're good to go. and and there there was an there was an ISP on the floor below us, just a like a little tiny ISP. And we drilled a hole through the floor and connected a null modem cable. [laughter]
41:10That that gave us our internet connectivity for like 100 bucks a month. so, I mean, we had just an absurdly tiny burn rate. and and and we also had, you know, a really tiny revenue stream, but we actually had more revenue than we had expenses. So, so, when we when I talked to VCs, we could actually Well, like I said, it's there's no silver bullet that I can point to as to why the our vehicle is a lot cheaper.
41:34we've really focused on reducing the cost across the board. I mean, for one thing, our overhead in a 30-person company is you know, an order of magnitude less than it is in Lockheed or Boeing. just just for starters. So, even if we did everything the same and bought the same launch vehicle, we'd be considerably cheaper.
41:52and then it every decision we've made has been with consideration to simplicity. And the reason for simplicity is because that both improves the reliability as well as reduces your cost. you've got fewer components, that's fewer components to go wrong, and fewer components to buy.
42:08I think there's there's I think a fairly significant innovation in our airframe, which is a semi-pressure stabilized monocoque with variable skin thickness and a common bulkhead. If you know what that means. it's I'd need a diagram to explain it all. but, the net result is that it's very cheap, and it's very mass efficient, and I think easy to test and quite reliable.
42:31our avionics system, to give you another example, our avionics system, we use an Ethernet on the vehicle to communicate. That may That may not sound like a great innovation, but it is in launch vehicles. all the other launch vehicles communicate in the vehicle by these serial cables that run the entire length of the vehicle. And so, you've got these these giant copper bundles, thick as your arm, running up and down the vehicle. Makes it heavy, it makes it expensive, and it's So, this this things like that which you when you add them all up, it it makes a huge difference.
43:03no, that's that's a good question. That's a good question. no, I would not. I think SpaceX is not This is advanced entrepreneurring. [laughter]
43:12And it it it it may also, you know, I can't tell you how many people have said that you know, the fastest way to turn you know, but the fastest way to make a small fortune in the aerospace industry is to start with a large one. so, you know, hopefully that doesn't doesn't work out, but I I would definite- I I think space is is a tough one for first-time entrepreneurs. [laughter]
43:36you're better off starting with something that that requires low capital, and space is a high-capital effort.
43:44Sorry, I have a last question.
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